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Introduction
We analyze the feasibility and efficiency of legal instruments that facilitate in obtaining legal redress for suffering harm. In doing so, we focus on the efficacy of Public Interest Litigations (PILs) in resolving problems in the Indian context. Theoretically the legal alternatives that can be used to contain harmful activities vary from private bipolar litigation to class action to regulation. While there has been an economic analysis of bipolar litigation (Shavell, 2003) and class action (Silver, 2000) , and regulation (Spulber, 1988) , there seems to be scant literature that looks at PIL from a Law and Economics perspective.
Past interest in the phenomena of Public Interest Litigation has concentrated on a legal justification of PIL based on arguments of "access to Justice" for the underprivileged masses (Baxi, 1987; Desai and Muralidhar, 2000) . This paper sets up a framework to analyze the economic efficiency of Public Interest Litigation in the Indian context. We make use of the literature on the bundling of special interests to argue that PIL can be justified as an economically efficient choice of redressel if there is insufficient incentive for private litigation, inability of class action to counter harm due to high transaction costs, lack of substantive law on regulation of the harm and/ or pervasive regulatory failures. Thus PIL is seen as an efficient method of bundling interests wherever there are failures of the kind mentioned. Environmental harm is seen to generate these specific conditions and therefore we would expect that PIL would serve to circumvent the above problems and would succeed in bundling special interests in a cost-minimizing manner to bring legal injunctions or compensations for harm done 3 . However, in order to assess whether PILs are an efficient alternative, it must first be proved that the other forms of legal actions are either too expensive or that there is a lack of substantive law to correct the harmful activity or that there are failures in regulation that have been in place that make the PIL alternative more efficient. Secondly, it must also be assessed whether PIL would be misused as a strategy to further private ends and open up a floodgate of litigation. We present the first part of the research in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the hypothesis that Public Interest Litigation, under certain conditions, could result in a cost-minimizing alternative to resolve environmental problems and suggest a methodology by which the economic efficiency of Public Interest Litigation can be deduced. This section also recounts the evolution of PILs in India. In Section III we present information in the Delhi Air-pollution case to show that class action was not pursued as means of redressel and the regulatory mechanism failed, but PIL made a difference in controlling pollution in the city.
II A) The Efficiency of Public Interest Litigation
When adequate statutes and laws are in place, judicial machinery is corruption-free and the victims are aware of their legal rights, justice can be efficiently imparted through conventional private litigations. 4 Alternatively, legislative measures in the form of regulatory acts may be taken to check socially damaging activities (Spulber, 1988) .
However, in the context of developing countries, private litigation does not seem to have been successful in protecting citizens from unwarranted actions of tort, particularly when negative externalities such as environmental pollution are present. One reason for this is that going to court may not even be a matter of choice to a large number of affected people who are unacquainted with their legal rights and, in the face of damages, simply do not have the means to file a case in the court 5 (Desai and Muralidhar, 2000) . Availing the services of formal Courts in the developing countries have a lot of hurdles such as illiteracy of the masses, hidden cost of geographical distance as only a few courts exist, adverse social and cultural norms that discriminate a section of the society and finally the corrupt courts.
The problem of private litigation is magnified, when the number of victims and the total damages to the society are larger but the individual share of damage is not large enough to create incentives for private litigation. Under such conditions of rational disinterest (Schaefer, 2000; Ott and Schaefer, 1996) private litigation would be uneconomical for the victims to take up individually and, if taken, uneconomical to the society. Moreover, if the court verdict and the subsequent benefits were to be mixed goods i.e. consisting of both individual and social benefits, rational individuals would only under-invest in appropriating legal justice.
Secondly, even if there were a civil liability rule in place, the outcome would be inefficient if the tort feasor has the opportunity of settling with the a few potential litigants in return for continuing his polluting activity. This small portion of the victims could become a credible threat and appropriate due compensation out-of-court from the tort feasor leaving the majority to their fate. Here only a part of the social cost is internalized by the tort feasor by means of paying compensation to group A. This leaves the economy still in a sub-optimal equilibrium where the socially damaging activity is over-supplied. On the other hand the possibility of Public Interest Litigation i.e. any individual with sufficient interest can file the case, would increase the number of potential litigants beyond the number of victims. This will have a deterrence effect on the potential tort feasors 6 .
The next possible alternative advised is regulating the economic activities of the agents such that they internalize these externalities. Regulation too is fraught with the danger of regulatory authority colluding with the potential injurers that would result in equally harmful situation (Spulber, 1988) . Regulation suffers a twofold danger of legislative authorities being "captured" by the powerful interest groups and/ or laxity in enforcing the laws enacted by the designated enforcing authorities. Lobby groups "capturing the authority" can be through exerting pressure at the time of legislation in order to dilute law so as to minimize the expected damages to their interests. This would misdirect the purpose of regulation. Further, regulation fails if the enforcing agency is not conferred with enough power to implement what they are supposed to 7 , or when the enforcement mechanism is corrupt and the enforcing agent succumbs to issuing false certificates in exchange for bribes.
To appropriate social benefits class action 8 is considered to be the alternative to unenforceable regulation with defective regulatory mechanism and to private litigation as the cost of litigation could be shared among the victims 9 (Epstein, 2003; Schaefer, 2000; Silver, 2000) . However, class action itself is fraught with a number of problems such as cost of collecting information about the victims and the damages and the cost of coordinating them all to achieve the collective interest. Coordination cost apart, there is also the hazard of free riders since the resulting judicial judgment is generally non-excludable (Bardhan, 2000) . In other words, the transaction cost of coordinating class action is, at times, prohibitively high.
To summarize, when large sections of the population is divorced from the formal legal system private litigation is inadequate; on the other hand, when there is a strong institution of "influence" wielded by interest groups, regulation becomes ineffective; class action is prohibitively costly or simply not feasible due to transaction costs.
In the developing countries, sluggish law enforcement, the lack of substantive law, and a weak legal system perpetuated by large members of the population not having access to education created a demand for alternate dispute resolution mechanisms. Educating the masses is an effective but long-term solution to the problem. Providing legal aid is also not feasible for the reasons of sheer number of possible cases and also lack of information on the part of the underprivileged would still keep them out of any intended support 10 .
Any alternative that reduces the cost associated with the above problems would have to be considered as an efficient alternative. What is required is a way to bundle special interests of large groups of people in a cost-minimizing manner and at the same time reduce the costs of coordinating such interests considerably. To accommodate this some innovation in law would be required.
The legal fraternity put forth an alternative that seems to coincide with the model that serves this very purpose and goes by the name of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). PIL, as the very name suggests, is meant to shield the "public interest". It is a lawsuit filed by a representative plaintiff or plaintiffs on behalf of the victims against tort feasors. According to Indian law, the definition of Public Interest has a very broad connotation. PIL is not defined in any statute or in any act. Innovative judges, who consider the interest of public at large, have interpreted Law to overcome the inadequacy of the formal court system and private litigation to solve conflicts at group level. Although, the main focus of such litigation is only "Public Interest" there are various other areas where a PIL can be filed e.g. violation of basic human rights of the poor, content or conduct of government policy or compel municipal authorities to perform a public duty. The proponents of PIL in the United States, state three theoretical justifications (Hershkoff) : First, PIL can be an effective means of correcting for any legislative lacunas developed which dilute or exclude the interest of a group of the population. In doing so it resolves the public choice problem of the affected parties. Second, PIL may also be used whenever the law on the book is ineffectively enforced. Third, it extends the judicial mechanism to the underprivileged. Thus, the justification for PIL comes not from economic considerations of efficiency, rather from concerns regarding "access to justice", issues pertaining to fundamental rights and those concerns pertaining to the legal "empowerment" of people.
It is a simple observation that "costs of going to court" or of litigation over a particular dispute or tort would depend, among other things, on the number of victims involved.
When the nature of harm involves both a single victim and a single tort feasor, private litigation would be used. Larger numbers of both victims as well as tort feasors contributing to harm makes private litigation more expensive compared to several victims filing a suit together and sharing the costs. Clearly, in the absence of significant transaction costs, there are economies of scale to combined litigation as opposed to individual litigation. When the number of victims increases even further, coordinating among the victims becomes costly.
At times it could prohibit any kind of action from being taken. Environmental conflicts, in most of the cases are of a nature where the people affected are wide spread and information required for coordination is very large and expensive to obtain. However, the totality of damage becomes significant due to large numbers being affected even though individually they suffer a small fraction of it. A method that demands no coordination among the victims solves the problem of rational apathy as any individual irrespective of his/her standing in the case can move the court (Tiwari, 2001) . The above diagram depicts the falling expected cost of litigation over alternatives as the number victims go up. It also indicates the zones and corresponding cost effective method of litigation. The case where there are few or a single victim and a few or single tort feasor is designated as a "dispute zone". In such cases, the nature of the harm, and the identity of the victims and injurers are well established. Larger numbers being involved is designated as a "conflict". Very large numbers being affected by a large number of tort feasors corresponds to environmental damages. This however is not confined to such harm. Any policy or legislation that is not in the public interest would also fall into this category.
We hypothesize that the cost of litigation in the case of large-scale environmental conflicts is lower if PIL is utilized in contrast to other alternatives in the presence of regulatory failures.
B) The nature of PIL in India:
The procedure for judicial review of administrative actions in the UK was revolutionized when locus standi was relaxed and courts sought only "sufficient interest" of the litigant as against " person aggrieved" (Cane, 1981) 11 . By relaxing locus standi it brought grievances of the victimized to the purview of courts and made the judicial process more participatory, expeditious and polycentric. In India, where the government enforcement machinery is said to be lax, court involvement is indispensable in ensuring due action is taken. One of the outstanding legal innovations in India in the nineteen seventies is the Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The Supreme Court (SC) thus opened its doors to the underprivileged by empowering any concerned citizen to voice in the court on behalf of them (Cunningham, 1987) .
The Supreme Court of India has clearly delineated the role of court and the purpose of public interest litigation 12 :
In Public Interest Litigation, unlike traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, there is no determination or adjudication of individual rights. While in the ordinary conventional adjudications the party structure is merely bi-polar and the controversy pertains to the determination of the legal consequences of past events and the remedy is essentially linked to and limited by the logic of the array of the parties, in a public interest action the proceedings cut across and transcend these traditional forms and inhibitions.
The period after 1970s witnessed, due to these legal developments, a rapid growth of PIL on various issues such as protecting fundamental rights, environment and corruption and on several large-scale government projects. In the early years of judicial activism SC assumed 11 R. V. Inspectorate of Pollution, ex parte Green peace, Ltd. (No. 2) [1994] 4 All E R 329 (High Court, by Justice Otton) has granted standing to the environmental group Greenpeace in the Thorp case to challenge a proposed license for a nuclear power plant. 
III Environmental Regulation and Environmental Legislation in India
It has been argued that harm will go uncompensated if either there is a failure of the The same tradition was followed after the independence. The first is Ex-ante capture and can occur at the time of legislation. The private interest theories of regulation suggest that regulation is demanded by private interest groups that stand to gain from it 15 . In the case of environmental legislation, capture of this kind would be reflected in compromising with the stipulations of expert-opinions or standards in the enactment of the law. Thus if the standards prescribed by the experts on pollution levels do not get translated into legislation and instead the enacted Law that is agreed upon is set below the recommended one, it can be indicative of capture. The stronger is the influence of interest groups upon the State, the more would be the dilution from the norm that is recommended.
The second aspect of regulatory failure is to do with the implementation of the (possibly diluted) act. This is ex-post failure. There can be many reasons for ex-post failure but the most common is corruption. One can however think of lack of sufficient infrastructure facilities to monitor violation of norms, laxity in monitoring, or a lack of corresponding legal authority in the hands of the monitoring agents to be effective regulators. A well-known version of the private interest theory of regulation is that the idea that regulatory agencies typically undergo a life cycle in response to the political environment and as time passes by and the interests of the people shift away from this policy, these agencies become vulnerable to domination by regulated interests. Many times the lack of public attention, expert information being supplied by the party under regulation, or the recruitment of 'experts' from the regulated industries can all weaken the regulatory agency and it's policy.
Which of these factors explains ex-post regulatory failure is an empirical question and would vary with each case. Documentation of Regulatory failure of both kinds can be done by analyzing the legislative process that led to the enactment of particular acts and to compare the norms that the act was based on (expert committee recommendations) with the final Act that was legislated. If there were no good reasons given for any dilution of the committee recommendations then one can conclude the presence of interest groups at work. Secondly, if data on the actual harm levels is obtained after the Act comes into effect, a consistently higher level of harm as compared to the standard set by the act would be an indicator of regulatory failure of the second kind. In some cases, the number of executive petitions filed (i.e. petitions that are filed by victims in the event enforcing agents fail to comply with the enforcement of the legislated standard) can also be an indicator of failure at the level of implementation. In the next section we use the evidence on the decision of the Supreme Court to close down industrial units in New Delhi, following a public Interest petition to assess the efficiency of such a mechanism to bring about the economically efficient outcome.
A) The case of Delhi Air Pollution
We have chosen Delhi as a case to substantiate our hypothesis to show that the conditions under which Public Interest Litigation is an effective legal procedure were largely met in this tertiary of Delhi. But there were lots of opposition to the standards and eventually the lobbyists succeeded in diluting the standards (Divan and Rozencranz, 2001) . Also there are multiple authorities to implement the set standards. But the regulatory authorities seem to have failed in controlling air pollution in Delhi. As is evident in the pollution data of the early 90's, the pollution level of SO 2 , NO 2 and SPM had been on the rise in the early 90's. Table: 1 indicates that the statues enacted, standard set and government machinery responsible for pollution control did not succeed in effectively controlling air pollution in Delhi. Particularly Suspended Particulate Matter in the air is phenomenally high compared to the international standard. The reason could be laxity in enforcement and enforcement was not mandatory for the agencies in the sense that the enforcement agencies were not accountable to any higher authority.
D) Ex post Regulatory Failure
The second type of regulatory failure that was discussed refers to the inability of enforcement authority to bring about a compliance level to the recommended standards. Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority for the National Capital Region states in a report on clean fuels that Sulphur content in diesel and petrol was ordered to be reduced to a maximum of 0.25% and 0.10% respectively and steps were taken to control Benzene and lead in petrol (EPCA, 2001) . All vehicles that are 15 years and older were phased out. All government vehicles were asked to convert to CNG. 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3
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The above diagram captures the time trend of pollutants SO 2 and NO 2 . Over years SO 2 and NO 2 concentration in the air has been brought down, particularly in the mid 90's.
Committee of Auto Fuel Policy states that in most of the major cities the level of pollutants such as SO x , NO x , SPM and PM 10 has gone down in 2000 comparing to that of 1995. The reasons for the reduction in pollution in Delhi could be attributed to court activism.
Responding to some of the public interest litigations the Supreme Court of India, assuming a proactive and progressive role of judiciary ordered to close down those companies that pollute the ambient of Delhi. More importantly to involve the public in the process of fighting environmental pollution SC had made it mandatory for the theaters, TV and radio stations to run environmental programs.
VI

Summary and Conclusions
We have shown in the paper that PILs have played a lead role in enforcing the environmental standards in the Indian context. Despite of strict environmental standards and the presence of regulatory authorities air pollution level in Delhi was exceeding the 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 µg/m3 acceptable levels. Not surprisingly there were no private litigation or class action against individual industrial units even thought many of them were situated in non-conforming residential areas in Delhi. This shows that private litigations and class actions are generally inadequate to resolve mass environmental torts. It was quite evident in this case that regulation too have failed due to ex ante and ex post captures. The government has softened the standards set by committees and even the reduced standards were not implemented effectively.
PILs and Supreme Court's environmental activism have resulted in reduction air pollution in Delhi. SPM, SO X , NO X have shown reducing trend in the late 90s and reached the acceptable level through court order to redeploy non-conforming polluting industrial units and adopt stringent vehicular emission standards. As it is argued PILs increase the number of potential litigants enormously, thus increases the deterrence effects, which in turn increases the expected cost of trail of the potential tort feasor. But deterrence effect is not evident from Delhi pollution case, as it is one of earliest of its kind. However it took 10 years to pass the judgment on a PIL case filed by Mr.M.C.Metha and court has issued as many as 52 directives in this regard. Even though PIL has resulted in reducing pollution, the time taken for this to happen shows that there are costs of implementing court decisions, which are generally not taken into consideration in standard analysis. The possibility that PIL could be used in the future to cater to private interests is also not ruled out and unless more cases are studied, the hypothesis that PILs are unambiguously welfare improving cannot be deduced. This paper takes only the first step towards a more complete analysis of the economic Efficiency of PIL.
